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BRANDYWINE, PENNSYLVANIA (11 Sep, 1777) Brandywine is located about 10 miles north of Wilmington Delaware. It wasn't a particularly formidable obstacle when considered in the light of military geography. The position's primary advantage lay in the depth of the stream. The Brandywine River at that time of year was about 150 feet wide and had a depth that forced a marching army to use a ford to make the crossing. Unfortunately, there were a number of such fords along the river. Washington had 11,000 troops and chose to make a defensive position using Chad's Ford as the center. Here the position provided a good defensive site and included a view of three fords: Chadd's, Brinton's and Painter's. Of equal importance to Washington was the availability of a good route for withdrawal should it be necessary. Major General Nathanael Greene was given command of the center. Nash's North Carolina brigade had been assigned to Greene and most were to be held in reserve behind the center of Greene's division; except for a few that were assigned to General William Maxwell. Anthony Wayne's Pennsylvania unit was positioned near the top of the hill behind some earthworks that had been rapidly thrown up near Chad's house (See Map #3). |
![]() Map 3 - Brandywine Battle |
Major General John Sullivan's division was positioned on the right wing, some two miles upstream in wooded hilly terrain. His forces would cover Brinton; Painter fords as well as providing right flank security should Howe attempt to flank Washington using one of these fords.
The left flank was assigned to General John Armstrong’s militia.
General William Maxwell was assigned with his eight hundred light infantrymen that included a number of soldiers detached from the North Carolina Brigade. They were positioned to the south on the far side of the Brandywine stream. Their purpose was to delay the British from reaching Chadd’s Ford.
IT BEGINS
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Sir William Howe Was a paradox: a skilled strategist and tactician, he out maneuvered Washington at every opportunity, yet time after time he failed to apply the final stroke that might have crushed the rebel army. |
Major General Lord Charles Cornwallis Was a distinctly unmilitary looking British officer who nevertheless, unlike many British officers of the day, was able to plan a campaign in detail, with dispatch and skill. Later, he became one of England's best generals. |
As dawn broke on the morning of Sep 11, 1777, fog clung to the ground till about eight o’clock. With the rising of the sun, it promised to be a hot and sultry day. Then American alarm guns firing from the top of the hill.
Troops on the heights above Chadd's ford could make out the green coats of the loyalist (British) rangers and riflemen commanded by Patrick Ferguson moving towards the ford. For two hours, Maxwell's light infantry and the North Carolinians engaged them briskly, inflicting severe casualties. The North Carolinians did well.
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Then an artillery duel began to develop as the British brought up their field guns. Upon several occasions Col. Martin's forces made the British to pull back from the far shore. But by 10:30 or 11:00 under cover of their artillery, the British had pushed as far as the banks of Brandywine River. Then a strange silence fell over the battlefield. They had just stopped. But why?
Washington should have guessed that this was only a faint meant to hold his attention. Howe had split his force in an effort to flank Washington's army. The British plan called for Cornwallis's command of 8,000 to cross somewhere upriver, and then turn the American flank and then fall upon the rear of the defenders at Chad's Ford. By 11:00 it was obvious the no real effort was being made by General Knyphausen to cross the Brandywine. Washington was worried.
Knyphausen’s indecision confused prompted Washington to move two divisions toward Birmingham Meeting House, 3 1/2 miles from Chad's Ford to protect his flank. Had Howe split his forces? There was no word from either flank; still Washington couldn't bring himself to believe Howe had split his forces. So Washington made the decision to recall Sullivan's force and reposition them along the Brandywine River.
Just after giving the order to Sullivan to reposition his troops everything seem to happen. First, a hatless, coatless, barelegged farmer burst into camp on a heaving, sweating horse, demanding to see General Washington. He identified himself as Squire Thomas Cheney, a good patriot, and declared that from the top of the hill at Birmingham Meeting house he had spotted the British marching up the far side of the Brandywine. If this were true, Howe’s forces would flank Sullivan's division and be able to attack the very heart of the army. All these intelligence reports conflicted and made it even more difficult for Washington to determine what was really going on. But that is the lot of war. Confusion.
Just then a rider brought Washington another message from Sullivan. "Colonel Bland, scouting with his troops of light horsemen sighted the enemy not too far from Birmingham Meeting House." It seems that Cornwallis had traveled much further upstream than anyone had thought, clear up to Jeffrie's Ford. Immediately,
Washington dispatched three to Birmingham Meeting House. Washington remained with Greene for he still thought the main attack would come at Chad's Ford. He still thought the flanking action to just a rouse.
It wasn't until 4:30 in the afternoon, that Washington was finally convinced that General Howe was trying to flank position. Sullivan had begun to move his command into a blocking action, but before he could get all his troops into
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position, Cornwallis attacked. Washington could see that Sullivan’s division needed reinforcing. Finally, Washington ordered Greene, with Nash's brigade to support Sullivan's forces, leaving only Wayne's Pennsylvania Continentals to hold the ford against Knyphausen's 5,000. This would be a tall order for Wayne’s men to hold the position; but if Sullivan wasn’t reinforced the army would be lost.
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Out-numbered by more than two to one, the American troops on the right flank under Stephen and Sullivan fought well. Cornwallis constantly kept them off balance by gradually working his troops to the right toward Dilworth and the road to Philadelphia. Five times Cornwallis' men drove the Americans back and five times the American's rallied and came surging forward. Finally, after an hour and a half of intense fighting and under constant pressure, the Americans were forced back. Sullivan gave the order to retreat; unfortunately the retreat turned into a rout. Although the officers' tried to turn the tied, nothing worked. Fortunately, General Greene's men refused to panic, and opened their ranks to allow Sullivan's men to pass through, then they reformed their ranks and presented a wall to Cornwallis' pursuing troops. Cornwallis' advanced was stopped! The army had been saved. Back at Chadd's Ford, Wayne's Pennsylvanians did quite well. Time and time again the British |
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supported by artillery attacked and were stopped. The Americans held on until near sunset. Only then Knyphausen's forces finally muster a sustained drive forcing Wayne's men from their positions and unfortunately, captured several American artillery pieces. There was nothing Washington could do but withdraw. Thus, that night the brigade moved to Chester, the designated rendezvous point, where Washington’s army would reform.
Except for those North Carolinians assigned to General Maxwell, the remainder of Nash's North Carolina Brigade didn't get into action that hot, dusty afternoon. But they were near enough to see the haze of battle and to smell the pungent odor of burnt powder.
Casualties were heavy: Americans 1,000, British 500; but while defeated the American Army was not a pushover as the British had thought they would be. Even the Continental Congress, who complained about everything, could not bring itself to heap criticism on Washington nor his Army. Indeed they voted thirty hogshead of rum for the army "in compliment.... for their gallant behavior."
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